what kind of knowledge would have to be gathered in order to violate one’s right to privacy

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• Open Access
• Published: 18 May 2020

Large data, privacy and COVID-xix – learning from humanitarian expertise in information protection

Journal of International Humanitarian Action volume 5, Article number:4 (2020) Cite this article

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic leads governments around the world to resort to tracking engineering science and other information-driven tools in lodge to monitor and curb the spread of SARS-CoV-two. Such big-calibration incursion into privacy and information protection is unthinkable during times of normalcy. Still, in times of a pandemic the use of location data provided past telecom operators and/or applied science companies becomes a viable option. Importantly, legal regulations inappreciably protect people'southward privacy confronting governmental and corporate misuse. Established privacy regimes are focused on individual consent, and most human being rights treaties know derogations from privacy and information protection norms for states of emergency. This leaves piffling safeguards nor remedies to guarantee individual and commonage autonomy. Withal, the challenge of responsible data employ during a crisis is not novel. The humanitarian sector has more than a decade of experience to offer. International organisations and humanitarian actors accept developed detailed guidelines on how to utilize data responsibly under extreme circumstances. This article briefly addresses the legal gap of data protection and privacy during this global crisis. Then it outlines the country of the fine art in humanitarian do and academia on data protection and data responsibility during crisis.

Introduction

On xi March 2020 the World Wellness Organisation alleged that the spread of COVID-19 has resulted in a global pandemic (WHO Director-General'southward Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-nineteen - xi March 2020 due north.d). Since the virus gained international attention afterwards its rapid spread in Hubei province in the People's Republic of Communist china (PRC) in December 2019, information technology subsequently appeared in other Asian countries such as Due south Korea and Japan. While some might argue that information technology was naïve of the 'Western World' to consider this crisis as a predominantly Asian trouble for too long, the shutdown of big parts of order in practically all European countries and increasingly the rest of the world has made clear that this is a global crunch that affects all of us for much longer than expected. In this situation strong and decisive measures to save the lives and livelihoods of people across all parts of the world are needed.

However, more than than always before we are prepared to handle such crisis. Amidst others, Large information, bogus intelligence and blockchain technology can concretely help to deal with this emergency (Qadir et al. 2016). For instance, location data from mobile phone companies can help in determining and understanding movement patterns of individuals and groups to potentially requite insight into how the virus spreads and whether instructions are complied with (Ali et al. 2016). Governments and private corporations are developing apps that allow users to share their whereabouts and social contacts on a voluntary ground (Google Is Now Publishing Coronavirus Mobility Reports, Feeding off Users n.d.; Baharudin and Wong 2020); Experts Warn of Privacy Gamble every bit U.s.a. Uses GPS to Fight Coronavirus Spread 2020). Blockchain technology might be able to help keep a decentralised and cryptographically secure ledger of stocks and medication to create smart supply chain direction (Zwitter and Boisse-Despiaux 2018). VR tin assistance teachers explore new avenues of digital classrooms with new means of interaction (Checa and Bustillo 2020). Still, as promising equally the apply of these emerging technologies might be, it is important to note that their employ comes with a digital footprint that invariably has consequences for information protection and privacy – on a global calibration (Zwitter 2015). Furthermore, political and corporate players might utilise the current situation to justify more than intrusive data employ for the hereafter and for times later on the pandemic is over.

This article volition first talk over the potential and current use cases of location data for public social club and specifically for getting the spread of COVID-nineteen under control. Information technology will then outline concerns regarding ongoing practices. We will subsequently argue that these concerns are not mitigated by applicable data protection regimes or human rights norms due to their focus on the individual and respective derogation norms. In conclusion, we propose that guiding principles and standards for information practices in the humanitarian field are applicable during this crunch, and they should be considered as minimum standards for all states and corporations considering the utilize of data-driven monitoring tools to tackle the COVID-19 crisis.

Location data, public guild and control

When fighting a big-scale crisis such as a pandemic it is of import for governments to understand why a threat is emerging, how the threat scenario develops, and whether the full general population complies with measures for containment. Governments and research institutions need data to develop insights on these aspects, with location data being particularly attractive every bit piece of work in the humanitarian sector has shown for many years by now.

When it comes to the apply of location data sourced through mobile communication infrastructure and location services specifically, many commentators have been surprised by the fact that the regime of the People'due south Republic of China (China) co-developed a mobile phone application informing users whether they have been in close contact with someone infected past COVID-19 (China Launches Coronavirus 'close Contact' App 2020). The insights presented by this app are based on the assay of location information collected through phone networks, WiFi connections, satellite-based radio navigation system (e.g. GPS, GLONASS, Galileo) and other surveillance assemblages producing information that reveal the location of individuals and crowds. Furthermore, apps with maps to track the disease besides became pop very quickly in Hong Kong (Latest Situation of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Hong Kong northward.d.), and Southward Korea (Coronavirus Mobile Apps Are Surging in popularity in Due south Korea - CNN due north.d.). In the PRC, this approach seems to have evolved into the 'Alipay Wellness Code', a arrangement that classifies residents based on an opaque methodology (Mozur et al. 2020). One time a survey has been filled out by a user, this data gets combined with other sources such equally location information. One time the data has been analysed, a QR code is generated which has i of 3 colours; green enables its bearer to unrestricted movement, the 'owner' of a yellow lawmaking may be asked to stay home for 7 days, and a ruby-red QR code results in two-weeks of quarantine.

In the meanwhile, the United states government is in active talks with several big technology corporations such every bit Google and Facebook to explore venues how location information could be used to gainsay the pandemic, including tracking whether people are keeping one another at condom distances to counter the spread of the virus (Romm et al. n.d.). Google has already used the pandemic to show some of the advantages of omnipresent location tracking (Google Is Now Publishing Coronavirus Mobility Reports, Feeding off Users' Location History due north.d.). Finally, surveillance corporations such every bit Athena Security and the infamous spyware firm NSO annunciate specialized surveillance cameras and dedicated data assay services using location information to runway the spread of the disease based on the movement of individuals and groups (Cox 2020; Israel Spyware Firm NSO Wants to Rail and Terminate Coronavirus – Bloomberg n.d.).

Human rights and data protection

Right now, the temptation is very strong to practise "any is necessary" (Sevastopulo et al. 2020). Undoubtedly, in times of crisis there is an increased need for governments to monitor and command the public, which might brand it necessary to limit individual freedom. Such decisionism characterizes many emergencies. Constitutions and human rights, however, are designed with such crises in mind. Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on the European level the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), are prepared to deal with such situations. Because such developments from a formal perspective, it is useful to take a look at the legal and institutional framework of the Council of Europe (CoE). This international organization administers and controls one of the most of import international human rights treaties guaranteeing individual freedoms, the European Convention on Homo Rights (ECHR). The CoE has established procedures and example-law for times of crunch like the current ane (Mokhtar 2004).

The guide on Article 15 ECHR for derogations in times of emergency has been updated recently on 31 December 2019 (Quango of Europe/European Courtroom of Human Rights 2019). States may derogate in situations of:

• war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation,

• taking measures which are strictly required past the exigencies of the situation,

• and provided that measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international law.

Furthermore, Article iv of the ICCPR is similarly worded and across that requires state parties to report to all other parties via the United nations Secretariat. Sure rights such as the right to life (except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war), the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, the prohibition of slavery or servitude, and the rule of no punishment without police force are non-derogable. However, many other rights are discipline to derogation, including especially the right to privacy, freedom of expression, the liberty of movement, besides as the liberty of assembly and association. Such derogations may simply be of temporary nature (Zwitter 2012). Both of these legal frameworks allow states for some flexibility past enabling them to temporarily derogate from some rights.

Data protection and privacy are human being rights that can exist derogated from during crisis. They can exist temporarily reduced when a public emergency calls for information technology. What makes this situation even more complicated is the use of data from and by corporate agencies. Only mentioning the outcome of over-dominant corporate power in the class of surveillance capitalism briefly (Zuboff 2019), data ownership is in principle a thing of contract law and in many cases a question of terms of apply that customers accept to accept past default when intending to use a service. Particularly now, individual corporations hold the key to using Big Data for tackling the corona crunch. Furthermore, typical data protection frameworks such as the EU General Information Protection Regulation (GDPR) are focused on individual rights and private consent. Hence, they exit out many aspects of collective autonomy as outlined beneath. In summary, standard data protection regimes and man rights law provide little protection for privacy and responsible data use during times of emergency.

Potential concerns

Over the final years much has been written about the balance between security and individual freedom, peculiarly on the false merchandise-off betwixt privacy and security (Solove 2011). While a pandemic such as the spread of COVID-19 requires comprehensive measures, we must keep in mind that the use of location information and other (potentially) personally or demographically identifiable data on such calibration results in the product of a 'data exhaust' that invariably has consequences. Simply because it might be an emergency, does non mean that everything goes.

The arguably under-considered apply of location data is surprising at this indicate when thinking virtually the unintentional revelation of the location and features of United states military bases through the usage of the fitness app 'Strava' past members of the forces (Liptak 2018), or recent work of the New York Times based on the analysis of a comprehensive fix of pseudonymized mobile phone records that allowed to identify several prominent and influential individuals upon closer scrutiny (Thompson and Warzel 2019). No executive powers enshrined in regulatory frameworks were necessary to acquire these datasets and carry out the analysis, which in itself shows that our societies lack advisable governance frameworks for such practices. Non only constructive oversight on the utilize of such data is missing, it is as well open up how individuals would be safeguarded against abuse, and which kind of remedies they could use to defend themselves. Considering this misuse of location data, the Federal Communications Commission in the US on 28 February 2020 proposed a fine of 200 one thousand thousand dollars for mobile phone network operators repackaging and reselling location data (FCC Proposes Over $200M in Fines for Wireless Location Information Violations 2020).

Furthermore, research over the past years has proven again and again that the combination of the production of unprecedented amounts of data and improving techniques to analyse large data sets are rendering most – if non all – state of the fine art practices to pseudonymize/anonymize datasets meaningless, at least equally time moves on (Rocher et al. 2019). The United nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy has rightfully highlighted the risks resulting from the combination of 'airtight' datasets with 'open up' ones (Cannataci 2017). In our work on Mobile devices as stigmatizing security sensors nosotros have proposed the concept of 'technological gentrification' which describes our lives in environments that are permanently monitored and where those believing in the benefits of omnipresent data return the choices of others de-facto obsolete (Gstrein and van Eck 2018).

While a crunch like the coronavirus pandemic requires defended, quick and effective measures we must non forget that data is contextual. One and the same dataset can exist sensitive in different contexts, and nosotros need appropriate governance frameworks to make certain that this information is being generated, analysed, stored and shared in legitimate and responsible ways. In calorie-free of the COVID-xix pandemic location data might be very useful for epidemiological analysis. In the context of a political crisis, the same location data can threaten the rule of constabulary, democracy and the enjoyment of homo rights.

Luckily, some authorities across the earth have already reacted to the potential threats resulting from the use of location data in order to tackle the current pandemic (Data Protection Law and the COVID-19 Outbreak n.d.). On sixteen March 2020 the European Data Protection Board released a argument in which chair Andrea Jelinek underlines that "[…] fifty-fifty in these exceptional times, the data controller must ensure the protection of the personal data of the data subjects (Olbrechts 2020). Therefore, a number of considerations should be taken into account to guarantee the lawful processing of personal data. […]."

While these efforts are laudable, it would exist preferable to have defended legal frameworks, created through democratic processes in parliaments, likewise as transparent policies. Given the necessity to act quickly, one might at least await governmental decrees or executive acts describing the ways, objectives and undertaken practices in a detailed way, rooted in proper legal basis and competences, including the establishment of oversight mechanisms. Instead, the electric current picture suggests that ad-hoc practices have to be justified by independent data protection authorities which take to compromise their long-term supervisory objectives for short-term support of the greater good.

Humanitarian guidelines for data responsibility

Because of the lack of legal guidance in many instances, it is important to resort to all-time practices established in unlike fields, particularly in the domain of humanitarian action. Over the by decades the humanitarian community has adult extensive expertise on how to deal with data during crunch responsibly. One core player in this field is the United nations' Part for the Coordination of Humanitarian Diplomacy (OCHA). Its Centre for Humanitarian Data worked - together with many experts - on detailed guidance notes that help to deal with data responsibly (Information Policy – The Heart for Humanitarian Data n.d.). This particularly concerns best practices in the cooperation between humanitarian, corporate and governmental stakeholders.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and Cherry-red Crescent published a detailed handbook on information protection in humanitarian action (Kuner and Marelli 2017). This handbook covers everything from basic data protection principles, to questions of information sharing and data protection impact assessments (DPIA) in humanitarian contexts. Furthermore, Role II covers specific scenarios and information collection methods such as the use of mobile apps, biometrics and cloud services. These guidelines cover largely the aforementioned aspects equally the OCHA guidelines. These concern particularly the fair information processing of vulnerable information subjects, data minimization likewise equally data retention and deletion.

Additionally, the Dutch Red Cantankerous together with other Red Cantankerous and Cherry-red Crescent societies initiated a group of expertise in the field of innovation and information scientific discipline for humanitarian action, which issued the "510 Information Responsibility Policy" (Van Der Veen n.d.). This policy introduces key principles such equally:

1. (1)

   Data Protection,

2. (2)

   Legality and Legitimacy,

3. (3)

   Do No Harm,

4. (iv)

   Respect for the Rights of Data Subjects (including access, rectification and erasure),

5. (5)

   Purpose Specification of Collected Data,

6. (six)

   Minimisation (collection on the basis of necessity and proportionality), and

7. (7)

   Data Quality as to accuracy, being up to appointment, valid, reliable and relevant.

One of the central findings is that data protection goes beyond the individual and includes vulnerable groups. This marks a shift from Personally Identifiable Data (PII) to Demographically Identifiable Data (DII) (Raymond 2017). Hence, data drove and utilization needs to follow the principle of proportionality and consider benefits and harms beyond individual interests. Furthermore, this thinking introduces a information lifecycle, which entails the stages of processing information from consideration of a potential information collection, over subsequent drove, to assay and deletion of the information.

Principles of data protection in humanitarian studies

At this stage it should be emphasized that the bookish customs has not been idle. A give-and-take surrounding information ethics has been held quite vigorous over past years. It ranges from questions surrounding the utilise of "public information" (eastward.1000. social media data), to biases, and includes considerations on nudging (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Zwitter 2014; Zimmer 2010; Chandler 2015). Experts in the field of humanitarian activeness, innovation governance and data protection have published extensively on utilities and risks of the use of 'large crisis data'. (Latif et al. 2019) A specific employ-example has been the domain of crisis mapping, with Ushahidi and Humanitarian OpenStreetMap launching these developments early (Ziemke 2012).

Of particular annotation in the past years has been the Signal Lawmaking of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (Greenwood et al. 2017). Its purpose is identification, definition and articulation of international Human Rights standards with regards to data and ICTs, equally well as their translation into the humanitarian context. Like the principles of the 510 Data Responsibility, the Indicate Lawmaking identifies a gear up of rights held by all data subjects including the protection of DII.

Some specific aspects of the Signal Code should exist highlighted: The right to data refers to the right of all people to generate, access, acquire, transmit, and do good from data during a crisis. The right to protection concerns protection from all harms that tin can ascend from the misuse and unintended consequences of information and ICTs, given that crisis-afflicted populations are peculiarly vulnerable. Privacy and security as a right refers to internationally recognised legal, ethical and technical standards of data protection and privacy. The right to data agency relates to private and collective agency with regards to collection, use and disclosure of PII and DII. Finally, rectification and redress of data is also a remedy that pertains to groups and individuals. A key element in all these points is non merely the abstruse being and observance of these rights, only to enable effective application procedures for individuals and populations affected by crises. In other words, it obliges humanitarians to institute procedures to requite outcome to these rights and potential claims of affected people.

Further central areas of business organization are (Karunakara 2013; Qadir et al. 2016; Gstrein and Zwitter n.d.; Ali et al. 2016):

1. (i)

   the potential use of Big Data for unethical ends;

2. (2)

   the potential to mislead through reliance on unrepresentative and biased data;

3. (3)

   the various privacy and security challenges associated with data (including the danger information being tampered with),

4. (4)

   and the erosion of humanitarian principles past the exploitative use of data through corporate agents.

Eventually, profound questions around the meaningfulness of concepts such every bit individual consent and the nature of effective pseudonymization and anonymization remain. Unfortunately, it goes beyond the scope of this short slice to explore these in detail, but considerations on 'group privacy' and informational self-determination in the digital age would be potential starting points for such in-depth give-and-take (Lu et al. 2012; Raymond 2017b; Taylor et al. 2017). Information technology needs to be reiterated that the humanitarian field is working on this subject extensively and with a mindset that is focused on using data responsibly, instead of mere compliance with regulatory frameworks, which demand to resort to abstract human rights provisions too quickly since these frameworks themselves are limited in scope and application. Hopefully, this gap tin be filled apace in order to exist able to fully focus on the containment of the pandemic, instead of additionally creating worries around the responsible use of data.

Conclusion

The use of location data to control the coronavirus pandemic tin can be fruitful and might ameliorate the ability of governments and research institutions to combat the threat more quickly. Information technology is important to notation that location information is not the only useful information that tin can exist used to curb the current crisis. Genetic data can be relevant for AI enhanced searches for vaccines and monitoring online communication on social media might be helpful to keep an eye on peace and security (Taulli northward.d.). Even so, the use of such large amounts of data comes at a price for individual freedom and collective autonomy. The risks of the apply of such data should ideally be mitigated through defended legal frameworks which describe the purpose and objectives of data use, its drove, analysis, storage and sharing, too equally the erasure of 'raw' data one time insights have been extracted. In the absence of such clear and democratically legitimized norms, ane can but resort to primal rights provisions such every bit Article eight paragraph 2 of the ECHR that reminds us that whatsoever infringement of rights such as privacy need to be in accordance with police force, necessary in a democratic society, pursuing a legitimate objective and proportionate in their awarding.

However every bit shown above, legal frameworks including homo rights standards are currently not capable of effectively ensuring data protection, since they focus besides much on the individual as the bespeak of departure. Hence, we submit that currently applicable guidelines and standards for responsible data use in the humanitarian sector should also exist fully applicative to corporate, academic and state efforts which are currently enacted to curb the COVID-19 crunch globally. Instead of 're-calibrating' the expectations of individuals on their own privacy and collective autonomy, the requirements for the employ of data should be broader and more than comprehensive. Applicative principles and standards equally developed by OCHA, the 510 project of the Dutch Red Cross, or by academic initiatives such as the Signal Code are valid minimum standards during a humanitarian crisis. Hence, they are also applicable minimum standards during the current pandemic.

Cadre findings that tin be extracted from these guidelines and standards for the practical implementation into data driven responses to COVIC-19 are:

• data sensitivity is highly contextual; i and the same data can be sensitive in unlike contexts. Location information during the current pandemic might be very useful for epidemiological analysis. However, if (ab-)used to re-calibrate political ability relations, data tin be open for misuse. Hence, any party supplying data and information assay needs to bank check whether data and insights can be misused in the context they are presented.

• privacy and data protection are important values; they do not disappear during a crisis. Yet, they accept to be weighed against corresponding benefits and risks.

• information-breaches are inevitable; with time (t) approaching infinity, the take chances of whatsoever system being hacked or becoming insecure approaches 100%. Hence, it is not a question of whether, but when. Therefore, organisations have to set up sound data memory and deletion policies.

• information ethics is an obligation to provide loftier quality analysis; using motorcar learning and big data might be appealing for the moment, but the quality of source data might be low, and results might be unreliable, or even harmful. Biases in incomplete datasets, algorithms and human users are abundant and widely discussed. We must not forget that in times of crisis, the chance of bias is more pronounced, and more problematic due to the vulnerability of data subjects and groups. Therefore, working to the highest standards of information processing and assay is an ethical obligation.

The adherence to these principles is particularly relevant in times of crisis such as now, where they mark the difference betwixt societies that focus on command and repression on the one manus, and those who believe in liberty and autonomy on the other. Somewhen, we volition demand to recall of including information policies into legal frameworks for state of emergency regulations, and coordinate with corporate stakeholders too equally private organisations on how to best deal with such crises. Data-driven practices have to be used in a responsible style. Furthermore, information technology volition exist of import to find whether data practices and surveillance assemblages introduced under current circumstances will be rolled back to status quo ante when returning to normalcy. If not, our rights volition go hollowed out, merely waiting for the next crisis to eventually become irrelevant.

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   Andrej Zwitter & Oskar J. Gstrein

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Zwitter, A., Gstrein, O.J. Large data, privacy and COVID-19 – learning from humanitarian expertise in data protection. Int J Humanitarian Action 5, 4 (2020). https://doi.org/x.1186/s41018-020-00072-6

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• Published: 18 May 2020

• DOI : https://doi.org/x.1186/s41018-020-00072-6

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